Held · Bookmarked
0 · 0
portfolios · users
Avg position size
—
of holders' portfolios
13F filers
1
institution
Market cap
$858.4M
38M shares
52-week range
$9.17 – $43.08
43% from low
Sector
SERVICES-ADVERTISING AGENCIES
Exchange
NASDAQ
CS
Borrow rate
1.79%
Moderate
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| 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.64B | $2.22B | $1.42B | $967.1M | $599.1M | $514.9M | $492.6M | $498.4M |
| Cost of revenue | $1.32B | $1.03B | $739.6M | $230.0M | $76.3M | $64.2M | $48.3M | $55.0M |
| Gross profit | $1.32B | $1.19B | $677.3M | $737.1M | $522.8M | $450.7M | $444.3M | $443.5M |
| Gross margin | 50.1% | 53.5% | 47.8% | 76.2% | 87.3% | 87.5% | 90.2% | 89.0% |
| R&D | $53.9M | $0 | $58.8M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Operating income | $54.0M | $39.8M | −$277.1M | −$4.7M | −$167.8M | −$18.3M | $8.8M | $13.0M |
| EBITDA | $138.8M | $115.8M | −$173.4M | $178.1M | −$114.9M | $23.5M | $9.0M | −$12.6M |
| Net income | −$11.1M | −$22.4M | −$287.9M | $118.7M | −$237.6M | −$55.4M | −$59.0M | −$83.5M |
| Net margin | -0.4% | -1.0% | -20.3% | 12.3% | -39.7% | -10.8% | -12.0% | -16.8% |
| EPS (diluted) | -0.39 | -0.50 | -10.02 | 3.68 | -7.88 | -1.77 | -1.51 | -2.08 |
Annual figures · source: Financial Modeling Prep
| Year | Est. revenue | Est. EPS | EPS range | # Analysts |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | $520M | $-0.13 | $-0.17–$-0.11 | 3 |
| 2027 | $556M | $0.83 | $0.66–$0.92 | 3 |
| 2028 | $605M | $1.21 | $0.78–$1.64 | 2 |
Forward consensus · source: Financial Modeling Prep
Groupon Inc is a globalised, scaled two-sided marketplace that connects consumers to merchants. Its categories include Local: local inventory includes things to do, beauty and wellness, food and drink, home and automotive services, online services, as well as other types of experiences and services. Goods: Includes merchandise across multiple product lines, such as electronics, sporting goods, jewelry, toys, household items and apparel, and Travel: Features travel experiences at both discounted and market rates, including hotels, airfare, and package deals covering both domestic and international travel. The company operates in two segments, North America and International, with the majority of revenue from the Local category from the North America Segment.
www.groupon.comNo one on the platform currently holds GRPN.
| Institution | Shares | Reported |
|---|---|---|
| Renaissance Technologiesas of 2026-03-31 | 619,413 | $7.4M |
| Execution date | Ratio |
|---|---|
| 2020-06-11 | 1-for-20reverse |
No one on the platform has traded GRPN yet.
| $383M |
| — |
| GETYGetty Images Holdings, Inc. | $0.96 | +2.91% | $402M | — |
| MAXMediaAlpha, Inc. | $12.39 | +4.29% | $670M | — |
Source: Financial Modeling Prep · peers by sector/industry
Trading at 1.9× sales vs its 0.9× historical median P/S.
Fair value ≈ $11.37 · price $23.60 today
Fair-value line = the stock's median historical P/S × sales per share. Price below the orange line = cheap vs its own history; above = expensive. Not investment advice.
$GRPN Shorts burying themselves more and more short interest now near 60% with 140% ownership 🧨🧨🧨🧨
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN - $22.63 was not a random low it was the confirmation of the $22.83 structural break; it was the point where the structural work on GRPN was effectively complete, and the data backs that up. From there, the stock has been trading in a regime defined by three hard numbers: a roughly $200M buyback, short interest holding around 60% of float, and institutional ownership that is effectively “strong hands” controlling nearly all of the remaining shares. Against that backdrop, 57.80 is not a hope level; it’s the first logical parabolic break where gamma and GEX dynamics can force the squeeze to show up in price. First, the buyback data is explicit. Management has authorized around $200M of repurchases, a figure that equates to a very large fraction of GRPN’s market cap at the time of authorization. That program hasn’t just sat idle: quarterly filings show tangible reductions in shares outstanding, including a standout period where over 6% of the float was retired in a single quarter. Taken together, those buybacks mean the tradable share base under the previous regime was structurally compressed by the time the stock had carved out its base around 22.83. Second, short interest isn’t a vague concept in GRPN "it’s quantified". Public short‑interest data has consistently shown short percent of float in the ~50–60% zone, with peaks that push toward or above 60% of the available shares. In absolute terms, that translates into tens of millions of shares sold short into a shrinking float, with days to cover repeatedly sitting in mid‑single to low‑double digits depending on volume. That’s proof that a significant portion of the reduced float is spoken for on the short side, and that any sustained up‑move can’t be shrugged off easily. Third, institutional ownership is not only high, it’s concentrated in strong hands. Ownership breakdowns have repeatedly shown institutional investors controlling essentially the entire cap table, often quoted near or at 100% of shares outstanding when you aggregate funds, pensions, and hedge vehicles. Within that, the roster skews toward small‑cap value, hedge funds, quant and event‑driven strategies , the kind of holders who can sit through volatility if their structural thesis remains intact. That combination is proof that the residual float is thin and tightly held, not a wide retail pool waiting to sell into strength. The roster includes small‑cap value funds, hedge funds, quant strategies, and event‑driven managers, Fidelity‑style enhanced small‑cap products, Marshall Wace‑type hedge funds, public pensions, and micro‑cap specialists. Fourth, when you put those three datapoints together – $200M in buybacks, ~60% short interest, and near‑total institutional control – the base at 22.83 marks the end of the “construction phase.” Below that level, the company and institutions were still doing the structural work: absorbing shares, retiring float, and allowing shorts to crowd in. Above that level, the mechanics are different: every additional dollar of price appreciation is sitting on top of a pre‑engineered imbalance between supply (constrained) and potential demand (shorts plus hedgers). Fifth, this is where the options market and GEX (gamma exposure) breakouts come into play. As GRPN trades higher, call open interest and dealer positioning start to matter more. When dealers have sold calls at strikes clustered around levels like 57.80, they are short gamma; price approaching and moving through those strikes forces them to buy stock to hedge. Because the float under 100 has already been materially absorbed by buybacks and institutions, that hedging flow doesn’t meet abundant supply – it competes directly with shorts trying to manage risk and with the company’s ongoing repurchases. Sixth, the proof of the gamma engine isn’t hypothetical; it’s embedded in the structure of the book. You have: A constrained float due to repurchases. A large, persistent short position (~60% of float). Deep institutional ownership that doesn’t easily hand back shares. Growing options activity with dealers on the other side of calls. In that configuration, a GEX breakout – a regime shift where dealer gamma flips from dampening moves to amplifying them – is highly likely once price clears dense strike bands. 57.80 is the first of those inflection levels where the options surface and spot price intersect in a way that forces dealer behavior to change. Seventh, that’s why 57.80 “should happen” and why a move toward 100 is plausibly explosive rather than just optimistic. The data tell you the structural setup is complete: around $200M of buybacks have retired a large chunk of the float; short interest still sits near 60% of what’s left; institutional holders effectively own the cap table; and the options market is now layered on top, ready to push dealers into forced buying as GEX breaks. Below 100, there is structurally not enough loose stock to comfortably satisfy all of these claims if they try to resolve at once. So once GRPN decisively breaks and holds above 57.80, the tape is no longer just reflecting “better fundamentals” – it is expressing the mechanical consequences of a finished structural setup, and that’s where the imminent, potentially parabolic squeeze lives.
$GRPN Keeps Climbing 📈 Monday delivered another leg up. $GRPN closed at $23.60, up 4.4% from Friday’s $22.60, after testing as high as $24.28 intraday. Volume came in at 2.26M shares — lighter than Friday’s surge, but still nearly 2x average. The bigger picture: this stock has gone $16.76 → $23.60 in five trading days — a real, sustained move, not a one-day fluke. Friday’s dip to $21 got bought, and today buyers pushed through to a fresh leg higher. Short float remains 60%+. With every green day, the math on a forced short-covering scenario gets a little more interesting heading into earnings (~Aug 4–12). Strength continuing. Eyes still open. 👀 Not financial advice. DYOR. $SPY
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN alright in about 4 minutes it is about to get weird
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN - Nice avg volume and great day... Just bought 10K more and 30 Sept low 20's contracts....
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN are we gonna see huge red candle or green at close
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN - I just saw someone say we have yo hold $23.60 as important, why? Not beating you up I dont see the reason would you explain? Please 24.01 Yess big
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN actually above avg volume on the day and we haven't gotten to the weird closing auction stuff yet
View on StockTwits ↗$GRPN - Lets go - Squeeze just a little more pain for the shorts....
View on StockTwits ↗Recent $TICKER stream from stocktwits.com — refreshed every 5 minutes. Sentiment tags are self-reported by posters. Not investment advice.
Click to see transaction details on SEC.gov. Form 4s cover trades by officers, directors, and 10%+ owners, due within 2 business days of the trade.